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1. Preliminaries: stories and slippage
We have barely begun to appreciate the myriad ways in which
virtual culture is about religion... The religion that today calls
for reflection does not answer questions or provide meanings but
abandons us ... Forever turning toward what is always slipping
away, we can never be certain what religion is about.!
Even when we think we have surrounded it, religion eludes us.
This strange slipping away is no mere disappearance but a
withdrawal that allows appearances to appear. 2
... given that interpretation is the work of the study of religion,
the subject reality must have a structure that constrains
instantiations of theory made upon it ... To hold that all religion
is founded on the incomprehensible is to negate the particularity
and distinctiveness of religions in any terms other than the
diversity of human responses to the unfathomable. This
approach mystifies religion beyond reach of academic study.3
When I originally gave this paper, my initial intention was to
demonstrate that a relationship existed between New Age religion
and technology, specifically 'cyberspace' and its hardware. This
continuing and fertile interrelationship undermined, in my mind,
substantialist notions of religion which are foundational to any
strong secularisation thesis which theorised an eventual end to
religion as such. Moreover, it seemed to argue for the dynamic and
relational activity of the religions we deal with.
Mark C. Taylor, About Religion: Economies of Faith in Virtual Culture,
Chicago, 1999, p. 6.
Loc. cit.
Sam Gill, Storytracking: Texts, Stories & Histories in Central Australia,
Oxford, 1998, p. 200.
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Of the English-language scholarship on the 'New Age', Wouter
J. Hanegraaff's publications, through sheer weight of ethnographic
detail (albeit of a literary nature) and the interpretative power of his
secularisation thesis, have since cast a shadow across any academic
discussion of New Age religion. l
Yet definitive examinations of religions will always need to be
re-examined. To echo Mark C. Taylor, the one thing we can say
with certainty about religion is that it is always dynamically slipping
out of our conceptual grasp. Technology became for me a case in
point: although an essential element of secular self-understanding,
Hanegraaff does not mention technology directly in his published
work. I was puzzled because the relationship had been well
substantiated by various observer-participant reports, although of a
journalistic cast, notably that of Douglas Rushkoft and Jeft Zaleski.2
Coming across Taylor's article, 'Terminal Faith,' what
impressed me was that not only were technology and New Age
religion explicitly connected but that the narrative that connected
them was historical though speculative.3 Curiously, there was no
acknowledgment of Hanegraaff. My attention, then, was ready to
spot his most recent collection of essays.4 I was surprised to find
both that his article was included and that it was largely unchanged.
What I did find novel and useful was the deconstructive language in
which he couched his understanding of the dynamic qualities that
seemed to evade conceptualisation, and with which I opened.
Equipped now with an angle and without giving my puzzlement a
second thought, I combined Hanegraaff and Taylor in order to
extend Hanegraaffs thesis, and gave the paper.
While writing, my puzzlement returned and only abated when I
stumbled upon a recent biography of Marshall McLuhan which, as
luck would have it, is the first to have complete access to his
personal archives and chronologically compared this with his
Wouter 1. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Esotericism. Esotericism
in the Mirror of Secular Thought, Leiden, 1996; for a brief but simplified
excursion, see 'The New Age Movement and the Esoteric Tradition' , in Roelof
van den Broek and Wouter J. Hanegraaff (eds), Gnosis and Hermeticism From
Antiquity to Modern Times, Albany, 1998.
Douglas Rushkoff, Cyberia. Life in the Trenches of Hyperspace, London,
1994; Jeff Zaleski, The Soul of Cyberspace. How New Technology is
Changing Our Spiritual Lives, New York, 1997.
Mark C. Taylor, 'Terminal Faith', in Paul Heelas (ed.), Religion, Modernity
and Postmodernity, Oxford, 1998, pp. 36-54.
Taylor 1999, Ope cit.
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published work. 1 The significance of McLuhan could not escape
even a casual reader of Taylor. What I discovered through reading
the biography is that not only is Taylor not representative of his
overall publications, but that the reality of his biographical history
was not represented either.
My strategy changed from that of furious combination to a close
reading of texts. The differences that I noticed previously between
the two versions of Taylor's article became revelatory, differences
that went beyond the use of McLuhan. Taylor's ignorance of
Hanegraaff could not be naivety, but a reflection of competition
between narratives that were at cross-purposes. They were both
sophisticated stories that were only intended to reveal selectively. By
no means a comprehensive analysis itself, my aim in writing this
paper now is· to follow as faithfully as I can the play of texts,
coordinating them as best I can with their subject reality. Where the
two coincide and diverge, I believe, has significance not only
regarding the relationship between New Age religion and
technology, but the strong secularisation thesis.
I have taken my inspiration for this 'method', slightly modified,
from that used by Sam D. Gill as he followed the threads of the
Arrente as subjects of particular ethnographers in the field through
to academic reconstructions of 'Aboriginal' religion as such:
This method will produce the story - or as I call it, the
storytracking - that interconnects the scholar with the scholar-
independent subject. The storytrack will tell the story of the
various academic operations conducted to build a bridge
connecting subject and scholarly report. An account of these
operations will reveal the character of the relationship between
the subject and scholar.2
The extent to which Taylor's notion of the incomprehensible is
useful to the academic study of religions as a viable interpretive
activity can be gauged by storytracking.
w. Terrence Gordon, Marshall McLuhan. Escape into Understanding. A
Biography, New York, 1997.
Gill, Ope cit., p. 5.
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2. A history which leads up to the 'New Age': missing the body of
evidence?
The comparison helps reveal the motivations and extent to which
the text is transformed through its presentation. I simply follow
the chain of citations, comparing presentation versions with
source versions to approach as closely as possible the
independent subject. 1
Paul Heelas, in his introduction to the volume in which Taylor's
article was fIrst published, described it as 'a history which leads up
to the "New Age.",2 This section will examine the concreteness of
this statement. I will establish this by juxtaposing the two versions of
Taylor's article (referred to henceforth as Taylor 1998 and Taylor
1999), seeking discontinuities. The citations of subject-realities
themselves will be compared to the source versions and their
historical contexts, in order to show how the texts have been
transformed through their presentation. Finally, some attempt will
be made to adequately account for the revealed situation.
2.1. Incarnating McLuhan
Taylor uses three citations of McLuhan; the first two can be found
in both, the third is used twice in Taylor 1999:
LSD is a way of mining the invisible; it releases a person from
acquiring verbal and visual habits and reactions, and gives the
potential of instant and total involvement, both all-at-onceness
and all-at-oneness, which are the basic needs of people translated
by electrical extensions of their central nervous systems out of
the old rational, sequential value system. Their attraction to
hallucinogenic drugs is a means of achieving empathy with our
penetrating electronic environment, an environment that in itself
is a drugless inner trip.3
... in the mechanical age now receding, many actions could be
taken without much too much concern. Slow movements insured
that the reactions were delayed for considerable periods of time.
Today action and the reaction occur almost at the same time. We
Loc. cit.
Heelas, op. cit., p. 10.
Taylor 1998, p. 39; Taylor 1999, pp. 116, 120-1.
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actually live mythically and integrally, as it were, but we continue
to think in the old, fragmented space and time patterns of the
pre-electric age. 1
Today, deep in the electric age, organic myth itself is a simple
and automatic response capable of mathematical formulation
and expression, without any of the imaginative perception of
Blake about it. Had he encountered the electric age, Blake would
not have met its challenge with a mere repetition of electric
form. For myth is the instant vision of a complex process that
ordinarily extends over a long period. Myth is a contraction or
implosion of any process, and the instant speed of electricity
confers the mythic dimension on ordinary industrial and social
action today. We live mythically but continue to think
fragmentarily on single planes.2
The first quote comes from a 1969 Playboy interview, itself selected
by Howard Rheingold in his Virtual Reality.3 Taylor makes central
use of this quote in his narrative, and that it is a very isolated
fragment does not leave a very convincing impression.
The other two quotes are from McLuhan' s most influential
publication, Understanding Media. As this is the only work Taylor
cites, I will look for similar material in it for a comparison before
moving on to McLuhan' s personal writings. Two motifs seem
obvious in these quotes - that of technology as the 'extensions of
man' (sic), and that of omnipresence and the return of the mythic
as the effect of electric speed. Taylor believes he is faithful to
McLuhan when he writes:
McLuhan saw electronic media as prosthetic extensions of the
human body. Computers become the brains, engines the legs,
video cameras the eyes, telephones the ears, and wires the veins
and arteries of the world organism.4
While the images can be seen throughout, it is not clear that
McLuhan has such a standardised picture of the notion himself.s
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media. The Extensions of Man, New York,
1964, p. 4; Taylor 1998, p. 45; Taylor 1999, p. 129.
McLuhan op. cit., p. 25; Taylor 1999, p. 130.
Howard Rheingold, Virtual Reality, New York, 1991, p. 323.
Taylor 1998, p. 46; Taylor 1999, p. 130.
McLuhan op. cit., pp. 20, 64,73, 67..
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First of all, though prosthetic, the connection between body and
media continues, and can never be removed from this interaction:
Any invention or technology is an extension or self-amputation
of our physical bodies, and such extension also demands ratios
of new e~uilibriums among the other organs and extensions of
the body.
In this way all technology was extension, not just the electronic;
moreover, McLuhan thought of the electrical extension of the
central nervous system as radically different:
whereas all previous technology ... had, in effect, extended some
part of our bodies, electricit¥ may be said to have outered the
central nervous system itself..
It could well be that the successive mechanizations of the various
physical organs since the invention of printing have been too
violent and superstimulated a social experience for the central
nervous system to endure.3
The roots of this 'dis[-]ease'4 and subjection are made explicit in
Gordon's biography of McLuhan: his Catholicism.s As Gordon
notes, though difficult to detect in McLuhan' s publications, the
connection between his faith and his media studies emerges clearly
in his correspondence and his private papers.6 Simply put:
'Electronic man is discarnate man' and '[d]iscamate man is not
compatible with an incarnate Church.,8 McLuhan was intensely
concerned to preserve the reality of the body, for 'immediate
analogical awareness,' through which an understanding of media
takes place, 'begins in the senses and is derailed by concepts or
Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 247.
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 39.
Gordon, Ope cit.: baptised Holy Thursday, 25 March 1937, and never failed to
make the anniversary in his diary, p. 74. That is not to say that his religious
history began on that day - strong early family Baptist influence, p. 24; faith
continuing in university years, Bible study, sincerity of his prayer life, p. 25.
Ibid., p. 75.
Marshall McLuhan to Father Laurence Shook, 20 June 1972, cited in Gordon
Ope cit., p. 219.
Marshall McLuhan to Clare Boothe Luce, 5 April 1979, ibid.
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ideas. ,1 While the dis-ease is apparent in Taylor's use of McLuhan,
there is no transparency regarding their Catholic theological
origins.
2.2. Materialising Eliade
Utilising 'LSD is a way of mining the invisible electronic world'
from McLuhan, Taylor claims that the 'fiber that links these
disparate points is forged in the crucible of alchemy.'2 In both
versions of the article, Taylor's understanding of alchemy is
informed throughout by Eliade; it is to this loose, shared narrative
that we will now 100k.3 The parts of the text where Eliade is directly
invoked include two direct quotes:
Alchemy is, of course, a magico-religious practice devised to
transform base metals into gold, closely related to different
strands of medieval Jewish and Christian mysticism, and
extremely important for the rise of modem science, originated in
ancient rituals associated with mining and metallurgy. Historian
of religions Mircea Eliade argues that, throughout history in a
broad range of cultures, activities of mining are closely
associated to those religions devoted to the earth goddess ...
Minerals were believed to be embryos that grow within the womb
of earth mother ...4
It is indeed remarkable that traditions, as numerous as they are
widespread, should bear witness to this belief in the finality of
nature. If nothing impedes the process of gestation, all ores will,
in time, become gold.5
Within this scheme, the labor of the miner assists the labor of the
Mother ... The role of the miner-obstetrician-gynecologist is to
Marshall McLuhan to lames Taylor, Letters of Marshall McLuhan, selected and
edited by Marie Molinaro, Corrine McLuhan and William Toye, Toronto,
1987, pp. 368-9, cited in ibid., 239. Hereafter referred to as Letters.
Taylor 1999, p. 121.
Mircea Eliade, The Forge and the Crucible: The Origins and Structures of
Alchemy, Chicago, 1978; Taylor 1998, p. 53, n. 1; Taylor 1999, p. 268, n. 9.
Taylor 1998, p. 39; Taylor 1999, p. 121.
Eliade op. cit., p. 50; Taylor 1998, p. 39; Taylor 1999, p. 121.
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accelerate the labor process. In other words, the miner's
contribution is speed, whose agents are heat and fire. Through
heat and fire ...The child ... must be polished and refined by a
process of cleansing and purification. This need gave rise to
techniques and rituals of metallurgy. 1
Alchemy extends and refines the techniques of metallurgy. No
longer satisfied with speeding up nature by generating heat, the
alchemist seeks a supplement to the supplement of fire ... [t]he
philosophers stone ... As alchemy is, in Eliade's view, "a
spiritual technique and a soteriology"... By refining base metals
into gold, the alchemist seeks to purify both self and world. The
goal of alchemy was to become as good as gold ...2
Like the good 'philosopher' or mystic that he was, the alchemist
was afraid of time. He does not admit himself to be an essentially
temporal being, he longed for the beatitude of paradise, aspired
to eternity and pursued immortality, the elixir vitae ... Above all
we must bear in mind that the alchemist became a master of
Time, when, with his various apparatus, he symbolically
reiterated the primordial cosmos and the cosmogony or when he
underwent initiatory 'death and resurrection'. Every initiation
was a victory over death, Le., temporality; the initiated
proclaimed himself 'immortal'; he had forged for himself a
post-mortem existence that he claimed to be indestructible.3
The strength and weakness of Eliade's 'History of Religion'
interpretation of alchemy lies in his authoritative grasp of the
multiplicity of religious structures by going beyond them to an
ontological 'sacred' which sustains them. Yet, as critics have
pointed out, if 'the student of religion is essentially a historian, then
there can be no privilege to myth or other religious material ...They
must be understood primarily as texts in context ... For there is no
primordium - it is all history. ,4 Eliade complicates matters by
admitting privately to extra-historical motives: 'I feel that, in
initiatory doctrine and rituals, I have discovered the only possibility
Taytor 1998, p. 40; Taylor 1999, pp. 121-2.
Taylor 1998, pp. 41-2; Taylor 1999, pp. 123-4.
Eliade Ope cit., pp. 174-5; Taylor 1998, p. 42; Taylor 1999, p. 124.
Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religions: From Babylon to Jonestown,
Chicago, 1982, p. xiii.
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of defending myself against the terror of history ... ,1 Dan Merkur
reminds us that
the Western alchemists never themselves claimed that
transmutation was spiritual rather than metallic or physical. Their
texts are literary works designed to be incomprehensible to the
uninitiated, and they have done their task well. Their writings
abound in allegories, ciphers, uses of common words in secret
technical manners, allusions, intimations, and outright
misdirections. What the texts were intended to conceal remains a
matter of highly variable interpretation.2
Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that Eliade had gained
such authority through initiation, although it is circumstantial.3 It
would account for how Eliade came to his 'matter-renouncing or
anticosmic approach to alchemy,' the common understanding of
alchemy in Paris occultism of the 1930s and 1940s, which saved
him from the 'terror of history' but it is far from an academic
study of religion. 4 The absence of spirit which imparts structure to
both matter and soul which characterises this understanding is not,
according to Merkur, 'originally alchemical' for 'only ethereal
phenomena is considered benign. ,S Merkur dates the origin of
alchemical mysticism to the Renaissance as its theoretical
background, Aristotle's 'ether', was not even available until the late
Middle Ages.6 The alchemical mysticism of centuries past was not
an 'anticosmic dualism but a distinctive type of visionary
experience.'7 In this way he develops, unlike Eliade, fundamental
discontinuities in the history of alchemy.
Mircea Eliade, Journal 11, 1957-1969. trans. Fred H. Johnson, Jr., Chicago,
1989, p. 86. Entry for 6 January 1960.
Dan Merkur, Gnosis: An Esoteric Tradition of Mystical Visions and Unions,
Albany, 1993, p. 55.
Steven M. WasserstroID, Religion After Religion. Gersholm Scholem, Mircea
Eliade, and Henry Corbin at Eranos, Princeton, 1999, pp. 41-47, 212, on his
close association with initiatory practice and practitioners and his efforts to
camouflage this anxiety of influence.
Ibid., p. 73.
Ibid., pp. 72-73.
Merkur, Ope cit., p. 106.
Ibid., p. 114.
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2.3. Ancient roots of modernism: rival genealogies of esotericism
Despite sharing this common narrative about alchemy, there are
several discrepancies between the texts, only two of which can be
dealt with in this paper. 1 The first is another quotation from Eliade
in Taylor 19?9 which is not in the earlier version:
Evidence that human sacrifices were made for metallurgical
purposes is to be found in Africa. Among the Achewa of
Nyasaland, the man who wishes to construct a furnace applies to
a magician (sing-anga). The latter prepares 'medicines,' places
them in a stripped maize cob and instructs a small boy how to
throw it at a pregnant woman, causing her to miscarry. The
magician then looks for the foetus and bums it, with other
medicines, in a hole in the ground. The furnace is then built over
the hole. The Atonga have a custom of throwing into the furnace
a portion of a placenta to ensure the success of the smelting.2
Immediately afterward, Taylor writes: 'As we have discovered
(chapter 3), traces of the ancient sacrifice can be found in the ashes
that remain in twentieth-century ovens constructed for no less
sinister rituals of purification.' 3
While I am not denying that the earlier version made similar
claims, the difference seems to be that the paper is now part of a
broader sustained argument about modernity. To this argument in
the third chapter we will now turn.
Taylor thought it significant that such shapers of modernity as
Nietzsche, Durkheim, Freud, and Bataille formulated their theories
of religion at the same time as artistic modernism. An assumption
they held in common is the belief in what both sets of modernists
described as 'the primitive.' He argues strongly, moreover, that
modernism presupposes primitivism:
For example: the millenarian poetry of Paracelsus, cited in Robert Gray,
Goethe the Alchemist: A Study ofAlchemical Symbolism in Goethe's Literary
and Scientific Works, Cambridge, 1952, p. 32; Taylor 1998, p. 41; an account
of a golem - Gersholm Scholem, On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism, New
York, 1965, p. 159; in Taylor 1999, p. 125.
Eliade op. cit., pp. 67-8; Taylor 1999, p. 122.
Taylor 1999, p. 122; however, according to Titus Burkhardt, in medieval
alchemy 'the real athanor [oven] in which the elixir is prepared... was none
other than the human body', in Alchemy. Science of the Cosmos, Science of
the Soul, London, 1987 [1960], p. 161. .
Taylor 1998, p. 40.
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indeed, they are two sides of the same coin .. Like the sacred,
whose substitute it becomes, the primitive is highly charged ...
On the one hand, the primitive represents illo tempore in which
life is harmonious, whole, unified, and fulfilled; on the other
hand, the primitive refers to prehistory in which life is
uncivilized, violent, horrifying, and savage.' 1
Taylor's treatment of Bataille is particularly instructive.2 Bataille
associates heterogeneity (of which the sacred is a subset) with
'unproductive expenditure (i.e., waste products of the human body,
erotic acts, trash, vermin, etc.)' as well as the 'violence, excess,
delirium, madness' of mystics, primitives, dreams, and the
unconscious.3 Violence and the sacred are conjoined in the sacrifice
but the forces unleashed cannot always be controlled.4 In Bataille's
reading of the sacred and its relationship to fascism, 'modem ovens
appear to rekindle primitive sacrificial fIres that once were deemed
religious. ,S Taylor suggests, through almost identical references to
the Shoah, a complicity between violence, alchemy and the sacred.6
The sacred, here, is identified with the modernist desire for unity,
communal and theoretical, as the most fundamental human desire
and of which Taylor is deeply suspicious.7 That he describes the
alchemist's fire which 'burns away polluting differences and
returns the many to the one in which they all originate' implies the
same, as his claim of equation of alchemy with 'the ancient source
of modernism.,8
It is not a coincidence, then, that an essay reflecting on the 'New
Age' and/of telecommunications draws on Italian Futurism
immediately prior to World War I to illustrate this modernism, in
particular the violent rhetoric of Marinetti.9 What interests Taylor is
that a 'number of modernists [were] drawn to fascism.,lo Marinetti
Taylor 1999, p. 53.
Ibid., p. 70.
Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, trans.
AIan StoekI, Minneapolis, 1985, pp. 142-3; quoted TayIor 1999, p. 74.
Taylor 1999, pp. 72-73.
Ibid., p. 74.
Ibid., p. 75.
Ibid., p. 76
Taylor 1998, p. 39; Taylor 1999, p. 120; Taylor 1998, p. 40; Taylor 1999, p.
122.
Filippo Marinetti, 'The Founding Manifesto of Futurism', in R. W. Flint (ed.),
Marinetti: Selected Writings, New York, 1972
10 Taylor 1999, p. 120.
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praised equally electricity and war for creating the possibility of
speed, which promises to break the chains that bind humanity to
time and space. 1 Marinetti declared: 'Time and Space died
yesterday. We already live in the absolute, because we have created
eternal, omnipresent speed.'2 In this way 'the alchemist' whose aim
was to accelerate the process of gold's gestation through violent and
intrusive processes 'anticipates the futurist' and his fascism.3
As it stands, this seems to have little to do with the New Age. It
still remains to be seen how Taylor bridges alchemy. In this regard,
Taylor writes:
Alchemy's occult forces and Hegel's electrifying spirit become
actual in the electronic telecommunications network now
encircling the globe. The matrix can be understood as the
electric embodiment of something like the Hegelian Logos ...4
Hegel's importance lies in Taylor's emphasis on the place of
electricity in his speculative vision.s For Hegel, the absolute is an
'occult force that gradually reveals itself in nature and history. In
the natural realm, the absolute is nowhere more apparent than in the
inextricably interrelated phenomena of electricity and light.'6 Not
unique to Hegel, this was a notion common to the Naturphilosophie
of German Romanticism.' Hegel developed his own notion of
electricity as a subtle revision of Schelling's philosophy of nature.
Schelling, like other Romantics, aimed to discern the concrete
expression of the absolute in the domain of nature.8 For him, the
activity of electricity symbolises an absolute that 'collapses
differences in an identity that can bear nothing other than itself.,9
Hegel critically insisted that such a return to an original oneness is
impossible. If 'the division and fragmentation plaguing modern
Ibid., p. 119; See Robert Hughes, The Shock of the New, New York, 1991, pp.
37-38.
Marinetti, Ope cit., p. 41.
Taylor 1999, p. 124.
Ibid., p. 129.
Taylor 1998, pp. 43-44; Taylor 1999, pp. 126-7; cf. G. W. F. Hegel,
Philosophy of Nature, trans. Michael Petry, New York, 1970, p. 174.
Taylor 1999, p. 126.
Cf. H. A. M. Snelders, 'Romanticism and Naturphilosophie and the Inorganic
Natural Sciences 1797-1840: An Introductory Survey', Studies in
Romanticism, 9, 1970.
Loc. cit.
Taylor 1999, p. 127; cf. F. W. 1. Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature,
trans. Errol Harris and Peter Heath, New York, 1988, pp. 99-100.
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experience are to be overcome, it must be through a "progressive"
dialectical process in which differences are preserved while
opposition is overcome.' 1
Surely, this account collapses historical differences engendered
by the passage of time. The 'Hegelian Logos' culminates in
McLuhan whose 'neoromanticism and neoidealism' forms 'a vision
of a harmonious New Age in which all is one and one is all' as if it
were identical in essence to German Romanticism.2 Again, despite
the span of centuries, Taylor maintains that: 'For Hegel, as for the
alchemist, macrocosm and microcosm perfectly mirror each other. ,3
Yet, hidden in an endnote to Taylor 1998, he does give a fragile
indication of the historicity of antecedents:
The pivotal figure who links alchemy and nineteenth-century
romanticism and idealism is Jacob Bohme. Bohme's complex
mystico-speculative vision represents a henological translation
and formalization of the central tenets of alchemy. Numerous
romantic poets and idealist philosophers were deeply influenced
by Bohme's vision. Bohme's writings were especially important
for Hege1.4
Taylor does not provide a reference for this and in the latter version,
this note disappears, though the sentence which it referenced is still
present: that the 'importance of alchemy and so-called occult
sciences for nineteenth century romanticism and idealism has not
been sufficiently acknowledged. ,s I suspect that the article's place
in the broader argument regarding modernity, gave it a more
polemical thrust in which Taylor's historical understanding became
more selective. Hanegraaff, on the other hand, is explicitly
contextual:
Loc. cit.
Ibid., p. 130; this despite the fact that while McLuhan does equate the 'new
global electronic interdependence' with the 'global village' (Marshall
McLuhan, The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects, Montreal,
1968, p. 67), it was not utopian: 'It never occurred to me that uniformity and
tranquillity were the properties of the global village ... I don't approve of the
global village. I say we live in it.' 'A Dialogue: Q& A,' in Gerald E. Steam
(ed.), McLuhan: Hoi and Cool. A Primer for the Understanding of and a Critical
Symposium with a Rebuttal by McLuhan, New York, 1967, p. 272.
Taylor 1999, p. 126.
Taylor 1998, p. 53, n. 4.
Taylor 1998, p. 43; Taylor 1999, p. 126.
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Ideas do not move through history unchanged: what 'continues'
is never simply 'the original idea' but, rather, the original idea as
perceived through the eyes of later generations. It seems to me
that any study of the historical connections between esotericism
and New Age should be based on that realization. 1
Understood in this way, New Age religion is a historical product of
the impact of the Western process of rationalisation and
secularisation, representing 'the decisive watershed in the history of
Western esotericism,' rather than as a reaction against modemity.2
He derives this notion of 'Western esotericism' from the scholar of
Christian Theosophy, and seventeenth century Illuminism in
particular, Antoine Faivre. In a number of recent publications,
Faivre has proposed to define Western esotericism as a distinct
'form of thought' which first became visible in Western history in
the early modern period (end of the fifteenth century), although its
various components are far 0lder.3 Jacob Bohme, as the 'founder'
of Christian Theosophy, is central to Faivre's work. Indeed, Faivre
has also made the same claim about the historical dependence of
German Romanticism upon Theosophy.4 Faivre does not argue for
complete continuity either; only with Paracelsus does Western
alchemy became a Naturphilosophie, an all-embracing vision and
necessary adjunct to a grand philosophical synthesis.s A source
which Taylor uses to support his account -
... our intention is not directed towards teaching anyone how to
make gold but towards something much higher, namely how
Nature may be seen and recognized as coming from God and
Hanegraaff 1998a, p. 376.
Ibid., p. 405.
Antoine Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, Albany, 1994, pp. 10-15;
Antoine Faivre and Karen-Claire Voss, 'Western Esotericism and the Science of
Religions', Numen, 42, 1995, pp. 60-62: Esotericism in this sense is
characterised by four intrinsic characteristics, which are more or less
inseparable, and two non-intrinsic ones, which mayor may not be present.
They are (1) Correspondences; (2) Living Nature; (3) Imagination and
Mediations; (4) Experience of Transmutation; (5) The Praxis of Concordance;
(6) Transmission. A critical discussion can be found in Hanegraaff 1996, pp.
396 - 403.
Faivre 1994, pp. 61-64, pp. 71-74, pp. 82-86.
Ibid., p. 62.
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God from Nature ... We wish with all our hearts that all men
might seek and find not gold but God. l
now becomes contextualised as a post-Renaissance alchemical
mysticism of a Paracelsian cast. Moreover, Hanegraaff s study of
New Age religion has led him to criticise Faivre's definition as
essentialist though programmatic.2 According to Hanegraaff, this
has led Faivre to emphasise the Hermetic-alchemistic
Naturphilosophie of the Paracelsian tradition and to marginalise the
'spiritualist/mystical' tradition, which became essential to the
Pietism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The 'spiritualist'
element is important because of its general relevance to the
emergence of characteristically modem types of subjective religious
sensitivity and, by implication, New Age religion.3 Alchemy,
ultimately, in itself is only peripheral to New Age religion.
Further, Hanegraaff argues that New Age Religion, though
sharing in these characteristics of Western esotericism, is rooted in
complex post-Enlightenment developments of Western religious
consciousness. The survival of esotericism under the new conditions
of secularisation produced a new and unprecedented phenomenon,
rooted in the eighteenth and flourishing in the nineteenth century.
Romanticism was one major strand which forms one of the
influences upon New Age religion.4 He saw it as a reinterpretation
of esoteric cosmology, based on universal correspondences which
were a legacy of Renaissance Hermeticism, under the impact of the
new evolutionism which changed the nature of esotericism but left it
with an internally consistent worldview.s
Besides invoking an essentialist 'neoromanticism and
neoidealism,' the historical paths whereby Taylor's German
Romanticism feeds into McLuhan are absent. In this connection,
Hanegraaff builds on the work of M. H. Abrams, who clearly
established the influence of esotericism upon Romanticism.6 In
George von Welling, 'Opus Mago-Cabbalisticum et Theosophicum', in Robert
Gray, Goethe as Alchemist: A Study of Alchemical Symbolism in Goethe's
Literary and Scientific Works, Cambridge, 1952, p. 19; Taylor 1998, p. 42;
Taylor 1999, p. 124.
Hanegraaff 1996, pp. 401-403.
Ibid., p. 405.
The other being occultism, which. was less successful because of an internally
inconsistent worldview; on this see Hanegraaff 1996, pp. 421-423.
Hanegraaff 1996, pp. 406 - 407
Ibid, pp. 416-421; M. H. Abrams, Natural Supematuralism. Tradition and
Revolution in Romantic Literature, New York, 1971, esp. pp. 146 - 196.
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particular, he utilises the dynamic image of the 'circuitous journey'
or 'educational spiral. ,1 Abrams meant that the 'distinctive
Romantic innovation ... the norm of truth, goodness, and beauty is
not the simple unity of the origin, but the complex unity of the
terminus of the process of cumulative division and reintegration,2
In doing so, 'the locus and criterion of ultimate value was
transferred from the Plotinian other-realm to this world of man and
nature and human experience'3 Through this schema, esotericism
became more pervasive in modem western culture. Even a cursory
reading of McLuhan's personal archives suggests such an
influence.
2.4. Fleshing out the New Age: epistemological strategies
Both Taylor and Hanegraaff attempt to delineate the development
and trajectory of New Age religion. They are both speakinp about
the same subject but have arrived at vastly different answers. At this
point, we need to understand what strategies they deployed to
interpret their subjects so as to arrive at their divergent answers.
Throughout his publications, Taylor engages in a similar pr~ect:
the effects of deconstruction on the Judaeo-Christian tradition. For
over a decade, he has been at the forefront of the application of
deconstruction within religious studies. At the same time, Taylor
also feels the impossibility of remaining continually in such a
process of deconstruction .and counterbalances with the figure of
Hegel:
Abrams ibid., p. 184: 'distinctive figure of Romantic thought and imagination
- the ascending circle, or spiral"; Hanegraaff 1996, p. 417; however,
Hanegraaff (among others) is critical of Abrams' piecemeal and selective
approach to esotericism, privileging the Neoplatonic over the
HermeticlTheosophic, instead of as an historically intertwined whole; cf.
Hanegraaff, 'Romanticism and the Esoteric Connection' (1998b), in Roelof
van den Broek and Wouter J. Hanegraaff (eds.), Gnosis and Hermeticism from
Antiquity to Modern Times, Albany, 1998, pp. 247-256.
Abrams op. cit., pp. 184-5.
Ibid., p. 183.
For explicit use of the term 'New Age religion': Taylor 1998, p. 39; Taylor
1999, p. 120.
See Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy, Chicago, 1986;
Erring: A Postmodern A/theology, Chicago, 1987; Altarity, Chicago, 1987;
Disfiguring: Art, Architecture, Religion, Chicago, 1992; Hiding, Chicago,
1997.
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While the theological and metaphysical presuppositions of
Hegel's philosophical project might seem dated, the complexity
of his dialectical vision enables us to discern religious
dimensions of modernity that less-sophisticated interpreters
overlook. 1
Taylor's concern to reveal the religious dimensions of modernity is
framed by the debate set in motion last century by Hegel and
Kierkegaard which created the parameters of modem theology.
Earlier this century, Karl Barth revived Kierkegaard with his stress
on human sin and divine transcendence. God is the 'wholly other'.
In reaction, Thomas J. J. Altizer, following Hegel, argued that
modernity is the historical enactment of the death of God
proclaimed by Nietzsche.2 In the course of the twentieth century,
'the death of God is historically enacted and embodied in society
and culture. The telos of this process is postmodemism and its
extension in virtual culture.' 3
It is important to remember that postmodernism, for Taylor,
'does not represent a decisive break with modernism but effectively
realizes its fundamental tenets. ,4 Again, we should, in light of this,
not forget that in modernity 'the full realization of the modern
presupposes the return to, or of, the original', the primitive.s
Fascism as 'modernity's desire for the primitive' has often been
what this return consisted of.6 The 'death of God' allowed the
transfer of 'spiritual' power from priest to the avant-garde
artist/architect immediately prior to World War I; the example that
Taylor uses, Marinetti, draws a compromised New Age into this
debate.'
With the movement 'from mechanical to electronic means of
(re)production, ideality becomes reality. In this postmodern culture
of images and simulacra, all reality is, in effect, virtual reality.,8 In
this situation where a foundational signified is absent, 'it's signs all
the way down.,9 Baudrillard and his notion of the 'procession of
Mark C. Taylor, 'Introduction,' in Mark C. Taylor (ed.) (1998b), Critical
Terms for Religious Studies, Chicago & London, 1998, p. 4.
Taylor 1999, p. 39.
Ibid., p. 21.
Loc. cit.
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 54.
Loc. cit.
Taylor 1999, p. 21.
Loc. cit.
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simulacra' is crucial to Taylor's reading of New Age religion as an
expression of virtual culture:
Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or
a substance. It is a generation by models of a real without origin
or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map,
nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the
territory - PRECESSION OF THE STh1ULACRA - it is the map
that engenders the territory and if we were to revive the fable
today, it would be the territory whose shreds are slowly rotting
across the map.' 1
It is clear that the idea of God as a transcendent other is as
impossible as the idea of an independent self. For Taylor, these are
now processes of the immanent, identified with the endless
circulation of significance and desire in intratextual reality.2 Taylor
maintains that McLuhan 'anticipates' Baudrillard with the idea that
'the implosion characteristic of experience in the electronic age is
created by speed. When speed reaches a certain foint, time and
space collapse and distance seem to disappear.' In McLuhan,
Taylor seems to find in this 'a vision of a harmonious New Age in
which all are one and one is al1.4 That McLuhan believed that
'electronic technology [is] turning ... illusion into the reality of
discarnate mankind, at home nowhere's could support Taylor. The
only problem is that Taylor has had to do violence to McLuhan' s
own understanding, based as it was on the danger of losing the
foundational signifier, the body.6
Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, New York, 1983, p. 2, quoted in Taylor 1999, p.
21.
Taytor 1984, pp. 199-33, pp. 97-120 in Graham Ward, 'Kenosis and Naming:
Beyond Analogy and Towards Allegoria Amoris' in Heelas 1998, p. 233.
Taylor 1999, p. 130.
Loc. cit.
Gordon, Ope cit., p. 156.
Also, it would mean ignoring his own paranoid stance against a cultic milieu
that Taylor saw him as being complicit with. From his correspondence with
Ezra Pound we know of his investigation of secret societies [Letters, p. 235]
who he believed were conspiring to keep him invisible [Letters, p. 233;
Gordon 1997, p. 158]; McLuhan included gnostics in the cavalcade of cabals,
and in this respect implicated his rival Nortrop Frye: 'Frye's Blake is [the] best
exposition of contemporary gnosticism that I know' [Letters, p. 237, cited in
Gordon 1997, p. 394]. The basis to Marshall's opposition to this
'gnosticism' lay in its tenet of an 'uncreated divine spark hidden in our corrupt
clay' [Marshall McLuhan to Walter 1. Ong, Letters, p. 244, cited in Gordon
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By asking the question as to 'whether effacement of divine is the
negation of God, or God's self-realization', Taylor points to a
possible solution to deconstruction. 1 He calls this position
'a/theology'; for an a/theologian, the 'first task ... is to reread the
theological tradition against the grain in an effort to discern the
unsaid in the midst of the said.,2 Taylor's misreading of McLuhan
now has a rationale. What he finds is a 'strange slipping away [that]
is no mere disappearance but a withdrawal that allows appearances
to appear.' This he terms the sacred and describes it as 'the other in
whose wake all gods emerge and pass away. If understood in a non-
Hegelian way, this wake mourns the endless death of God.'3
A1theology is pertinent to religious studies, for in the 'effort to
overcome the privileging of theology in general and Christianity in
particular, [it] turned to social sciences... belief and ideology were
not left behind but merely changed names.' 4 When understood in
this way, 'the shift from theology to theory does not, as many
contemporary theorists think, escape God but exchanges overt faith
for covert belief in the One in and through which all is
understood. ,5 It is interesting that he cites Smith in this connection,
to the effect 'that what unites the fragmented field or nonfield of
1997, p. 394]. McLuhan's view of electronic man's discarnate state as
'sinister' [NAC, Marshall McLuhan to Larry Henderson, The Catholic Register
20 October 1975, cited in Gordon 1997, p. 224], which creates 'complete
angelism ... the pure subjective being' which is 'everywhere at the same
moment' [unpublished interview, cited in Gordon 1997, p. 435] shed further
light on this. On the problems of this interpretation of 'gnosticism', see
Wouter J. Hanegraaff, 'A Dynamical Typological Approach to the Problem of
Post-gnostic Gnosticism', ARIES: Association pour la Recherche et
l'Information sur l'esoterisme, 16, 1992, and Michael Allen Williams,
Rethinking 'Gnosticism '. An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category
Princeton, 1996. Paradoxically, Jaron Lanier, a key developer of VR (virtual
reality) and loose adherent to New Age religiosity, has a positive valuation of
the body as the foundational signifier: 'the sense organs are almost a better
defining spot than any other spot in the creature. They're central to identity
and define our mode of being.... The whole notion of bypassing the senses is
sort of like throwing away the treasure', Rushkoff, Ope cit., p. 71; 'I have
always thought that virtual culture is essentially a way of bringing the body
into computer culture', Zaleski Ope cit, p. 229.
Taylor 1999, p. 22.
Ibid., p. 40.
Ibid., p. 41.
Ibid., p. 52.
Ibid., p. 76.
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religious studies is a shared interest in theory.' 1 Remembering
Smith's criticism of Eliade earlier on, who also used the category of
the sacred, it is significant that Taylor criticises religious studies for
falsely freeing 'themselves from the limitations imposed by
religious interpretation of religion.'2 Altheology is still a religious
position, but one 'which values difference without devaluinScommonality and pursues unity without repressing differences.'
For religious studies, 'the task of thinking at the end of theory is to
think this endless deferral [of the sacred] repeatedly.,4
Hanegraaff may be said to represent the approach of the
academic discipline of Western esotericism. It has recently been
delineated as a separate discipline within religious studies by such
scholars as Faivre and Hanegraaff himself.6 Having such a recent
origin, with scholarship beginning now in full consciousness of this
fact, the discipline has necessarily become acutely involved in the
major methodological controversies of its parent discipline, mainly
the debate over reductionism as against religionism.7
The position taken by these scholars has become largely
empirical in approach, steering clear of both reductionist and
religionist theoretical positions through an 'emicletic' distinction,
that is, between the 'metaempirical' assumptions the believer holds
and the 'empirical' interpretation of it respectively.8 This rests on
Ibid., p. 52.
Loc. cit.
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., p. 79.
Most recently, Faivre 1994; Faivre and Voss 1995, pp. 57 - 70; Antoine
Faivre, 'Questions of Terminology proper to the Study of Esoteric Currents in
Modem and Contemporary Europe', in Antoine Faivre and Wouter J.
Hanegraaff (eds.), Western Esotericism and the Science of Religion. Selected
Papers presented at the 17th Congress of the International Association for the
History of Religions, Mexico City 1995, Leuven, 1998.
Wouter I, Hanegraaff, 'Empirical Method in the Study of Esotericism', Method
and Theory in the Study of Religion, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1995; Wouter I.
Hanegraaff, 'Introduction: The Birth of a Discipline' (1998c) and 'On the
Construction of "Esoteric Traditions"'(1998d) in Faivre and Hanegraaff, Ope
eit., 1998.
For the most recent instalment of this ongoing debate, see Thomas A.
Indinopulos and Edward A. Yonan, Religion and Reductionism: Essays 0 n
Eliade, Segal, and the Challenge of the Social Sciences for the Study of
Religion, Leiden, 1994; for an examination of the debate in terms of the
discipline of Western esotericism, see Hanegraaff 1995, pp. 99 - 108.
Ibid., pp. 65 - 67; Hanegraaff's notion of empirical research, as distinguished
from 'reductionist' and 'religionist' programmes is informed by Ian Platvoet,
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the supposition that scholarship in itself does not have direct access
to the 'metaempirical' but only through its historically available
expressions and as it cannot therefore either verify or falsify its
existence, or any claims made about it, methodological agnosticism
is the only proper attitude. This achieved in the 'emic' stage
through the phenomenological practice of epoche, 'bracketing'
one's preconceptions! Building on that problem, Hanegraaff has
recently presented a typology of etic constructs of esotericism.2 As
they are not discovered but 'produced', it is necessary that
criticism ... of constructs of 'esotericism' should begin with
considering the subjective motivations which inspire scholars to
invest so much of their energy in this task. What kinds of
interests, we should ask, are served by the constructs· of
'esotericism' as a tradition?3
Three possible motivations arise, only two of which are relevant to
our purpose.4 First, the 'strictly historical'; while the main concern
is to correct the 'marginalisation' of esotericism in mainstream
historiography, such scholarship often succeeds in demonstrating
the important contributions 'esoterists' have made to the emergence
of modemity.s Hanegraaff would himself belong to that category.
The second is the association of esotericism with 'irrationallity,
superstition, or religious error. ,6 They usually subscribe to a
modem secularist worldview, and see esotericism as a dangerous
temptation. Many of these scholars argue that modem culture
remains threatened by irruptions of the irrational. It is important to
be clear about the several responses this position creates:
some of the scholars 'invent tradition' (a dangerous and
subversive counter-tradition, in this case) ... others deny that
'The Definers Defined: Traditions in the Definition of Religion', Method and
Theory in the Study of Religion, 2, 1990.
Hanegraaff 1996, p. 4.
Hanegraaff 1998d, pp. 13-15.
Ibid., p. 17.
Loc. cit. The third being the common motivation of 'dissatisfaction with the
religious or spiritual situation of contemporary Western society, and a
corresponding search for more fulfilling alternatives. To point out that there
has been an important but neglected 'esoteric tradition' in Western culture,
embodying spiritual perspectives and values which have been ignored or
forgotten by modem man, is a powerful way of criticizing the status quo.'
Ibid., p. 18.
Ibid., p. 17.
189
The End of Religions? Religion in an Age of Globalisation
'esotericism' is a historical tradition at all, but present it rather as
a recurrent disease. Not all these scholars present themselves
explicitly as enemies of 'esotericism' (they may instead regard
themselves as objective scholars); but they all share a worldview
which is incompatible with it, together with an interest in
favourably opposing that worldview to the irrational. I
Taylor's altheology falls into this category. It seeks to counteract
the collapsing of differences that theory is still left with after
theology has been deconstructed. This concern leads him to see
modernity's desire for the primitive, in every sense of the word, as a
backdoor for the violence of the irrational: 'the light of reason is
always shadowed by primal urges that never disappear. ,2 Alchemy
is implicated in that almost shrill criticism of the modem search for
unity. Taylor's a/theology is ahistorical; for him esotericism recurs
because it is irrational. Though aware that what is culturally relative
has a history, he does not apply this to the development of New Age
religion.3 Ultimately, by defining modernity against 'the primitive',
his analysis is polemical when a 'strictly historical' approach would
have been more instructive.4
Ibid., p. 18.
Taylor 1999, p. 76.
Taylor 1999, p. 80: 'Nature, in other words, is culturally relative and, as such,
has a history.'
As a religionist, Taylor's Hegelianism could also be interpreted as a
motivation. Cf. Hanegraaff 1998, p. 18: 'it would be simplistic to expect all
scholars of 'esotericism' perfectly to fit one of the three niches. Some belong
to more than one; and others are motivated by far more specific concerns,
conditioned by highly personal and contextual circumstances.' The polemical
is not essentially inappropriate; Andrew Ross (utilised by Taylor 1999, p.
268, D. 23) by taking this 'cultural studies' approach, recognises the New Age
as an extension of the Enlightenment project of development and scientific
rationality; however, he acknowledges the disadvantage of this polemical
position in that it neglects the more exhaustive 'ethnographic' study of
cultural communities. See Andrew Ross, 'New Age Technoculture,, in Cary
Nelson, Paula A. Treichler, and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), Cultural Studies,
New York & London, 1992, p. 537. The other major study in the academy of
New Age religion that is neither reductionist nor religionist is that of the
contemporary critical 'sociology of religion' represented by the 'Self-ethic' of
Paul Heelas, The New Age Movement. The Celebration of the Self and the
Sacralization of Modernity, Oxford, 1996. An analysis of esotericism, through
not named as such, has been part of 'sociology of religion' since its inception:
see Emst Troeltsch, along with Weber one of the founders of sociology, and
his typology of church, sect and cult (mysticism), and CoHn Campbell, 'The
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3. Toward a critical theory of technology and religion
When a theorist of some kind argues about the cultural impact of
technology as such, we can be pretty sure that her own use of the
term technology has a certain amount of theory built into it, and
that such theory my well reflect her particular agenda for
cultural reform as well as more obscure subjective factors.
Indeed, in considering the assertions of such a theorist, it is
prudent to watch out for uses of the term technology that are
biased or manipulative. 1
When Taylor speaks of virtual technology, he uses· the same
language of irrationality, violence and deviance as with his
discussions on alchemy and the modernity/primitivism pairing:
'Our consideration of metallurgical and alchemical myths and
rituals suggests that such dreams of unity are far from innocent ...
trace the darker aspects of virtual technologies'2;' a surprisingly
short step from the futurists' apocalypticism to influential versions
of the cybertopia many are projecting for the next century. ,3;
'continuity from the Futurist apocalypticism to the technocratic
visions of cyberspace touted by counterculturalists.,4
Such language suggests a certain amount of theory has been
built into it and that underlying it is an agenda for cultural reform. I
am indebted to Jay Newman, with whose words we opened, for his
clear thinking regarding our confused and confusing discourses
about religion and technology. Newman has usefully recognised
that theorists who represent themselves as critics and would-be
reformers of contemporary culture in a discourse about religion
and technology are usually antitechnologists to some degree.s
Taylor seems to fit this description, but more specifically he is best
seen as a religious antitechnologist. Newman notes that the religious
critic of technology is almost inevitably drawn into the discussion of
Cult, The Cultic Milieu and Secularization', A Sociological Yearbook of
Religion in Britain, 5, 1972. Troeltsch, Campbell and Ross have influenced
Hanegraaff s position.
Jay Newman, Religion and Technology. A Study in the Philosophy of Culture
Westport, Connecticut, 1997, p. 40.
Taylor 1999, p. 134.
Ibid., p. 120.
Loc. cit.
Newman Ope cit., p. 52.
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certain technologies and the role they play in hindering the
realisation of transcultural ideals.! Again, Taylor seems to
substantiate this. For example, he argues that in 'contemporary
culture, the transformer is no longer religion ... but the electronic
net in which we are already entangled. ,2 The religious
antitechnologist thinks that technology is notably 'at the expense of
religion. Concern about comgetition is central to almost every major
antitechnologist's position.' This explains why so much of the
religious antitechnologist's argument is secular, at least on the
surface, and especially so in its initial stages of development.4
Newman argues that religious antitechnologists may talk about
certain technologies but rarely in terms of 'the changing relations
between particular religious phenomena (beliefs, attitudes, values,
practices, institutions, and so forth) and particular technologies. ,S
Rather, they hold essentialist views of technology that cannot be
proved one way or the other; far 'from a specific technology of
limited use, virtuality is a cultural condition from which there is no
escape.,6 Taylor claims that 'the transition from religious, to the
chemical, to the electronic prosthesis extends the process of
sublimation in which matter becomes increasingly rarefied or
idealised and thus appears ever lighter until it becomes nothing but
light.'7 By providing a continuum with alchemy, virtual
technologies are essentialised; as we have seen it is not historically
Ibid., p. 75.
Taylor 1999, p. 138; however, confusingly, earlier he actually argues for a less
determined model of human action, Taylor 1999, p. 110: 'The mind is neither
hardwired in a way that inevitably imposes immutable structures nor a tabula
rasa passively awaiting impressions. Rather, the structure of the brain is
noncentralised, multidimensional, and malleable. Organised performance
emerges from ostensibly chaotic behaviour through something like a phase
shift or a quantum leap. While partly preprogrammed, the matrices of
perception and conception are also culturally constituted and thus historically
emergent and constantly changing.' This is also inexplicable in terms of hi s
ahistorical understanding of New Age religion.
Newman 1997, p. 11.
Ibid., p. 75; similarly, 'There is no need to mention Christianity. It is enough
that it be known that the operator is a Christian. This job must be conducted on
every front ... to educate a huge public, both Catholic and non-Catholic, to
resist that swift obliteration of the person which is going on', Marshall
McLuhan to Father Clement McNaspy, Letters, 180, cited in Gordon Ope cit.,
pp. 132-3.
Ibid., p. 2.
Taylor 1999, p. 133.
Ibid., p. 125.
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accurate either. His 'history of the twentieth century' as 'the story
of the progressive dematerialization of culture' offers further
confirmation. 1 Such essentialist views are invariably determinist.
The essentialist position of the antitechnologist is encouraged by
the fact that the 'distinctiveness theory' is widely accepted by
observers who are not committed to the antitechnologist agenda.2
The advocates of the 'distinctiveness theory' hold that a
fundamental relationship exists between modem technology and the
machine, again a theory that is difficult to prove.3 In this regard,
Taylor writes that the 'movement from the industrial to the
electronic age repeats the shifts from mechanical to organic
metaphors for envisioning reality, which makes the emergence of
nineteenth-century romanticism and idealism.'4
It is also encouraged by a general confusion as to what
technology is, coupled with the assumption that we already know
what it is. Even scholars of technology prevaricate. Joseph Aggasi
writes that 'technolory in general is not definable in any narrow
clear-cut definition' and that it is often 'used loosely in different
contexts and it is not at all clear how it would be understood in
general.,6 Samuel C. Florman complicates the matter by pointin~
out that technology is 'constantly being defined and redefined'
The main problem seems to be a gap between the generic and
ordinary uses of the term.8 However, Newman suggests that the
problem can be circumvented by 'paradigms of the historically
(and culturally) fundamental types of technology.'9 Newman
continues:
Ibid., p. 129.
Newman, op. cit., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 55.
Taylor 1999, p. 130; Taylor 1998, p. 46.
Joseph K. Agassi, Technology: Philosophical and Social Aspects, Dordrecht,
1985, pp. 23-4.
Ibid., p. 21.
Samuel C. Florman, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, New York,
1976, p. x.
Newman, op. cit., p. 41.
Ibid., p. 44; e.g., working stone, bone, and wood; rotary motion; fire making,
fuel, and lighting; textiles, basketry, and mats; building in brick and stone;
water supply; irrigation, and agriculture; mining and quarrying; extracting,
smelting, and alloying; fine metal-work; land transport without wheels
(including roads and bridges); wheeled vehicles; boats and ships; recording and
writing; measures and weights; and ancient mathematics and astronomy; cf.,
Charles Singer, E. J. Holmyard, and A. R. Hall (eds.), A History of
Technology. Volume One: From Early Times to the Fall of Ancient Empires
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nearly every item on the list would be regarded by almost all
ordinary speakers of our language, as well as advanced students
of cultural theory, as referring to a type of technology (or a
group of types of technology) that corresponds to an
exceedingly large class of particular technologies ... almost
everyone would grant that all (or virtually all) the items on the
list qualify as general paradigms of technology.!
Newman accords the categorisation of technologies into paradigms
of historical types of central importance to a 'proper understanding
of the relations between religion and technology.'2 Such historical
analysis shows that 'religion has survived wave after wave of
radically new technology; it has to a great degree inspired many of
them, and perhaps to an even greater degree it has been
substantially transformed by them.,3
I would tentatively support an approach that looked at 'the
changing relations between particular religious phenomena (beliefs,
attitudes, values, practices, institutions, and so forth) and particular
technologies' in terms of 'paradigms of the historically (and
culturally)fundamental types of technology.'4 I would suggest that
this survival and transformation is best looked at in terms of a weak
secularisation thesis. No such undertaking has been attempted as yet
in regard to Western esotericism.s Clearly, while it was Taylor that
Oxford, 1954, pp. 9-10, 16-17, 19-21, 23, 26-31.
Ibid., p. 45.
Ibid., p. 60.
Loc. cit.
Ibid., p. 44
An attempt has been made by Erik Davis, Techgnosis. Myth, Magic, and
Mysticism in the Age of Information, New York, 1998. He utilises the
presuppositions of Jungian depth psychology and its influential interpretation
of Gnosticism to analyse contemporary information technologies and their
spiritual roots and reflections: 'I am attempting to understand the often
unconscious metaphysics of information culture by looking at it through the
archetypal lens of religious and mystic myth ... from the hermetic perspective,
which reads images and synchronicities at least as deeply as facts, the mythic
structures and psychology of Gnosticism seem strangely resonant with the
digital zeitgeist and its paradigm of information,' p. 80. Davis is free to utilise
intuitive and mythological cues that at times provide insight through
imaginative reconstruction from sources unacknowledged by the others.
However, as Richard NolI has made very clear, the Jungian/archetypal
approach is itself a religionist approach; that is, lung and his ideas can be
squarely situated within the context of German Romanticism, occultism,
Naturphilosophie and the trajectory of the western esotericism which it
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made the connection, he cannot be historically valid given his
irrationalist and anti-technologist perspective. On the other hand,
Hanegraaff, while silent, does have an alibi: 'it was not my intention
to write a brief history of Western esotericism, but to highlight only
those historical developments which seem to have been crucial
factors in creating conditions for the emergence of New Age
religion. ,1
Such a history of a specific current of modem European
religiosity must include a relationship with specific types of
technologies in a limitative fashion. The parameters of this work can
be found in the overlap between Hanegraaff and historian David
Noble.2 Noble's work, taking up a critical stance to technological
determinism, aims at dismantling the erroneous stereotype of
progress, where religious tendencies would historically be
superseded by advance of scientific technology. Viewed from a
larger historical perspective, the two tendencies have actually never
been far apart. Noble argues that the contemporary situation is 'a
continuation of a thousand-year old Western tradition in which the
advance of the useful arts was inspired by and grounded upon
religious expectation. ,3 The useful arts became implicated in the
Christian project of redemption - the recovery of mankind's lost
divinity.4 Over time, technology came to be identified more closely
with both lost perfection and the possibility of renewed perfection,
and the advance of the arts took on a new significance, not only as
evidence of grace, but as a means of preparation for, and a sure sign
of, imminent salvation.s
Historical continuity was not direct. The monastic and
millenarian conceptions of redemption which had ideologically
ignited the advance of the arts, themselves the novel development of
proclaims to explain, Richard NolI, The lung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic
Movement, Princeton, 1994 passim. The historian of psychology Henri
ElIenbuger agrees that 'lung's analytic psychology ... is a late offshoot of
Romanticism' which has returned to 'unaltered sources of psychiatric
Romanticism and philosophy of nature,' Henri ElIenberger, The Discovery of
the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry, New
York, 1970, p. 657. For a recent deconstructive counterpoint to Taylor see
Richard Coyne, Technoromanticism: Digital Narrative, Holism, and the
Romance of the Real, Cambridge, Mass.; London, 1999.
Hanegraaff 1996, p. 406.
David Noble, The Religion of Technology. The Divinity of Man and the Spirit
of Invention, New York, 1998.
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., p. 12.
Loc. cit.
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Erigena and Joachim of Fiore, crystallised as never before during
the Reformation. 1 Significantly, major figures of Western
esotericism are part of Noble's narrative: Pico, Ficino and 'the
Renaissance alchemists and illuminati who followed them,2;:
Agrippa3, Paracelsus4, Brunos, Johann Andreae (probable author of
the Rosicrucian manifestos and Fama Fratemitatis6), and Francis
Bacon among them. The involvement of Freemasonry with the
institutionalisation of science is also examined.7 It is surely not a
coincidence that these periods of time Noble talks about areWthose
which are crucial for the formation of early modem western
esotericism. That Hanegraaff emphasised the 'spiritualist' currents
of esotericism highlights the possible relationship such currents had
with the development of capitalism, industries, and formation of
nation states. Another avenue would be the institutionalisation of
culminative science and the entrepreneurial application of scientific
knowledge, within the context of the sporadic subjectivisation of
western religiosity.
4. An end(note) to religion: implicating culture and technology
Religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study. It is created
for the scholar's analytic purposes. Religion has no independent
existence apart from the academy. For this reason, the student of
religion must be relentlessly self-conscious. Indeed, this self-
consciousness constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost
object of study.8
'Cultural competition,' Newman argues, 'is often salutary, and
much of it is inevitable; and as beneficial as cooperation can be for
all parties concerned, it is not always as beneficial as constructive
competition.,9 His words, though taken out of context, apply
equally well to academic constructs: the coordination of texts is a
game seriously intended. The question must be asked how we are to
Ibid., pp. 44-5.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid., pp. 36-7.
Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 41.
Ibid., pp. 73-82.
Smith 1982, p. xi, emphasis in original.
Newman 1997, p. 165; cf. Jay Newman, Competition in Religious Life
Waterloo, Ontario, 1989.
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judge texts well played. I have found Gill's 'technique' has given
'weight to the academic enterprise, thus avoiding the lapse into pure
simulacra, by grounding interrretation in the stated subject reality',
in this case New Age religion. The game that Taylor plays, I find, is
a game where you make all the rules up as you go along: 'In this
postmodern culture of images and simulacra, all reality is, in effect,
virtual reality.2 Given Taylor's insistence on 'the sacred' that is
'always slipping away', Gill can show that this a game without the
rule of the subject:
To the extent to which the study of religions is understood as
being inseparable from apprehending the ineffable, or even the
study of patterns of manifestation based on a priori unverifiable
assumptions, the field falls short of being academic, though it
may serve the beliefs of religious scholars. The difficulty with
this understanding of religion is that the study of religion must
become, in part, the manufacture of simulacra, bearing only the
flavour or terminology of various historical and geographical
specificity so as to appear real.3
Still, the relationship between specific currents of Western
esotericism and specific historical types of technology, remains,
essentially, untouched. A more extensive answer to this question will
require another forum and would have been tangential to this
exercise.
Disagreements about the precise relations of religion, culture,
and the various 'forms' of technology can, I suspect, never be
satisfactorily resolved because underlying them are even more
fundamental disagreements about the nature of culture itself.4 The
idea of culture is less a conceptual tool than a bundle of arguments,
moral persuasions, in brief, an icon of a certain epistemological
position we are persuaded to assume.s In this way, the term culture
not only began by definitely containing the idea of betterment or
improvement but still retains this meaning today in many usages,
both popular and intellectua1.6 Newman's most fertile suggestion
Gill Ope cit., p. 43.
Taylor 1999, p. 21.
Gill Ope cit., p. 200.
Newman, Ope cit., p. 154.
Tomoko Masuzawa, 'Culture,' in Taylor 1998b, p. 90.
A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (with assistance of Wayne Untereiner and
appendices by Alfred G. Meyer), Culture: A Critical review of Concepts and
Definitions, New York, 1963, p. 283.
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helps to bring together religion, technology and culture as 'distinct
but compatible ways of understanding the same essential
phenomenon - the effort of human beings to ameliorate their
condition, and that of fellow human beings, by means of the
production or creation of things that they earnestly believe will
make people better and better off.' 1
However, his suggestion that every age is necessarily a
technological age as well as being 'modem' in relation to earlier
ages; and that religion, 'like technology itself ... is ... perpetually
"modern" and vital', while it undercuts the argument for the
uniqueness of modernity, historically misses much more.2
Modernity, at the very least, involves a kind of perpetual critique.3
The basis of 'amelioration' involves this critique; yet, what lies
behind this dynamic? Part of the answer, I suspect, lies in claims
made by Ernst Benz that millenarianism is 'one of the strongest
impulses for man's technological development and realization' and,
bearing this in mind, that 'the founders of modem technology have
felt that the justification of the most far-reaching aims of their
technological effort could be found in this very thought of the
destiny of man as imago dei and his vocation as the fellow worker
with God ... to co-operate with God in the establishment of his
Kingdom and ... to share God's dominion over the earth.,4 If it is
the case that millenarianism has been at the basis of the perpetual
critique of modernity since its historical beginnings, then the strong
secularisation thesis, culminating as it does with the end of religion
as such producing utopian results, is also part of this 'amelioration.'
Both Taylor and Hanegraaff realise the importance of
millenarianism to New Age religion, which in its own way, looks
forward to a similar event: the end of organised religion.s
Similarly, if 'the New Age Movement as a whole is based on a
pervasive cultural criticism directed against the dominant values of
the modem West' then so is the strong secularisation thesis.6 Finally,
it may be true that 'the secularization of esotericism - should be the
Newman Ope cit., p. 161.
Newman Ope cit., p. 130; Newman 1997, p..60.
Gustavo Benavides, 'Modernity,' in Taylor 1998b, p. 188.
Ernst Benz, Evolution and Christian Hope, New York, 1975, pp. 123-5.
Taylor 1999, p. 117: 'New Age as a descendant of millenarianism meant the
end of time which is, in effect, the collapse of space'; Hanegraaff 1996, p .
366: 'expectations of a coming New Age, the most direct expression of the
movements criticism of the worldview's dominant in Western culture, modem
Western culture in particular.'
Hanegraaff 1998a, p. 371.
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top priority of the academic study of esotericism and New Religious
Movements' and that it 'is as a result of that hiatus that erroneous
theories based on unhistorical presuppositions remain largely
unchallenged.' 1 On the other hand, it is also true that the concept of
secularisation, if it is not taken as a cultural artefact produced by
unique historical developments in Western social thought, may
obscure any future research on the ameliorative relationship
between religion, culture and technology, and its historical roots in
millenarianism.2
Hanegraaff 1996, p. 407.
For more on the debate about secularisation, see Daniel Bell, 'The Return of the
Sacred: The Argument About the Future of Religion,' Zygon, Vol. 13, No. 3,
1978; Bryan Wilson, 'The Return of the Sacred', Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1979; Karel Dobbelaere, 'Secularization: A
Multi-Dimensional Concept,' Current Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1981; Oliver
Tschannen, 'The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization,'Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1991; David Martin, 'Sociology,
Religion and Secularization: an Orientation,' Religion, 25, 1995.
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